Tie-Breaking Rules and Divisibility in Experimental Duopoly Markets by Puzzello, Daniela
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Tie-Breaking Rules and Divisibility in
Experimental Duopoly Markets
Daniela Puzzello
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6436/
MPRA Paper No. 6436, posted 22. December 2007 18:30 UTC
Tie Breaking Rules and Divisibility in
Experimental Duopoly Markets1
Daniela Puzzello
University of Kentucky
July 2006
Abstract
This experimental study investigates pricing behavior of sellers in duopoly markets
with posted prices and market power. The two treatment variables are given by tie
breaking rules and divisibility of the price space. The first treatment variable deals
with the rule under which demanded units are allocated between sellers in case of a
price tie. A change in divisibility is modeled by making the sellers’ price space finer
or coarser. The main finding is that the incidence of perfect collusion is significantly
higher under the sharing tie breaking rule than under the random (coin-toss) one,
especially when the price space is less divisible.
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1 Introduction
The goal of this study is to shed some light on factors that affect pricing
behavior and collusion incentives in market experiments. Previous experi-
mental research suggests that the type of trading institution employed can
prominently affect pricing behavior (e.g., Plott and Smith [28]). Further-
more, a well established experimental research program studies pricing be-
havior within the context of a particular market institution (see, for instance,
Alger [1], Cason and Davis [5], Davis, Holt and Villamil [9], Davis and Wilson
[10], Friedman and Hoggatt [18]), and seems to suggest that environmental
details play an important role. This paper falls more closely in this second
strand of literature, in that we keep fixed the trading institution and we focus
on factors that might facilitate collusion.
On the one hand, there are several papers that study factors facilitating
collusion in Cournot markets. For instance, the number of firms in a mar-
ket, repeated interaction, information about rivals’ actions and profits, are
some of the factors affecting collusion incentives (see Huck, Normann, and
Oechssler [23], Huck, Müller, and Normann [22], Feinberg and Husted [15],
Huck, Normann, and Oechssler [24])2.
On the other hand, this paper examines the effect of tie breaking rules and
divisibility on tacit collusion in Bertrand duopoly markets with capacity con-
straints. There tends to be some tacit collusion in Bertrand duopoly anyway
(see Dufwenberg and Gneezy [13])3 but we find that, under a specific com-
bination of the treatment variables, prices are consistently high and markets
with both sellers charging the joint profit maximizing price are common.
The first treatment variable, namely the tie breaking rule, deals with the
rule under which demanded units are allocated between sellers in case of equal
posted prices. We explore two possible such rules. Under the random tie
breaking rule (referred to as R) ties are broken randomly, i.e., the simulated
buyer picks randomly which seller to approach first. On the other hand, the
buyer equalizes purchases among the tied sellers under the sharing tie breaking
rule (referred to as S). In the game we designed, under the assumption of risk
neutrality and the Nash equilibrium concept, the tie breaking rule should
not affect pricing behavior, since the ex-ante profits are the same under both
2Also Bertrand oligopoly markets are studied in [24].
3 In [13], the authors investigated a game designed to “give the Bertrand model its best
shot at not being rejected by the data” (p.8).
1
rules.4
Random and sharing tie breaking rules are used by government agencies in
procurement auctions environments and might have an impact on collusion
(see McAfee and McMillan [25] and Davis and Wilson [10]). For instance,
McAfee and McMillan [25] observe that government agencies often employ a
random tie breaking rule to deter collusive behavior.
Provided that tie breaking rules come into play in case of price ties, then
it is natural to inquire about the divisibility of the price space since it affects
the occurrence of ties. We model divisibility by making the sellers’ price space
coarser (Less Divisible) or finer (Continuum). The emphasis on divisibility
is not minor as lower divisibility might simplify the strategy space of sellers
by allowing fewer choices. There are several environments where divisibility
might affect pricing behavior. An example is currency redenomination which
might cause a change in money divisibility, where the term divisibility refers
to the fact that money can be broken in smaller or larger units. For instance,
most of the countries that adopted the Euro currency experienced a decrease
in divisibility and a price increase that has involved mostly services and some
small-ticket items during the changeover.5
The main focus of the paper is on the following question: Are lower divisi-
bility and a sharing tie breaking rule going to facilitate tacit perfect collusion?
We answer this (and other) questions in a very simple environment.6 In
particular, we concentrate our attention on Bertrand duopoly markets (with
capacity constraints) and we keep pairs fixed since this makes pricing decisions
easier for subjects7 (who have to worry only about one other player’s strategy).
Furthermore, since the buyer is simulated, the focus is clearly on the sellers’
side of the market. We think it is reasonable to take such a duopolistic setting
as a starting point.
We find that tie breaking rules have a significant effect on prices. In
particular, a sharing tie breaking rule facilitates perfect collusion. As far as
4 In contrast, in our design, note that ex-post, under R profits are unequal, while under
S they are equal.
5Clearly, a change in divisibility is not the only factor explaining the price increase for
small ticket items. Many other factors (related to the demand side as well) are involved in
this phenomenon, i.e., menu costs, psychological pricing, etc.
6Even though the environment is simple, it has been studied in a variety of settings (see
[6] or [11]) and it captures some of the features of decentralized electricity markets (see [14]
or [30]).
7 In the stage game.
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divisibility is concerned, it seems to sharpen the latter result.
We think that the results concerning tacit perfect collusion are rather
puzzling. In fact, a strategy supporting perfect collusion where sellers make
equal profits can be chosen under both tie breaking rules. On the other hand,
in order to attain equal profit, it is worth pointing out that under the sharing
tie breaking rule it is sufficient that subjects post the same prices, while under
the random one, subjects should additionally restrict the number of units
posted for sale. That is, in our environment perfect collusion is facilitated
when subjects have to worry about coordinating only on the choice of one
variable (the price) rather than the choice of two variables (both price and
quantity).
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature
review. Section 3 contains a discussion of the equilibrium predictions. Then,
in Section 4, we describe the experimental design and procedures. The ex-
perimental results are presented in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, we offer
some concluding remarks.
2 Literature Review
Numerous experiments illustrate that pricing behavior is strongly influenced
by both market structure and the market institutional environment. A well
established experimental research program studies factors affecting pricing
behavior within specific market institutions. For instance, prior posted offer
experiments focused on factors such as the number of sellers (see Davis, Holt
and Villamil [9]), the amount of information provided to sellers (e.g., Kruse,
Rassenti, Reynolds and Smith [4]), the role of subject experience (Alger [1],
Benson and Faminow [2], Friedman and Hoggatt [18]), mergers (e.g., Davis
and Holt [8]), and so on.8
Some of these studies involve duopoly markets as well (e.g., Davis, Holt
and Villamil [9], Friedman and Hoggatt [18], Alger [1], Benson and Faminow
[2]).
To the best of our knowledge, there are few studies focusing on the effect
of tie breaking rules and divisibility. More generally, in several market envi-
ronments, the sharing tie breaking rule is adopted as ties are usually broken
8According to Davis et al.[9], static market power leads to price increases in posted offer
markets with three sellers, while the effect is not clearcut for duopolies. Both across sessions
(see [2]) and within session (see [1]) subject experience seems to increase the likelihood of
collusive outcomes.
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by sharing the demand (e.g., Alger [1], Brown-Kruse [3], and Davis, Holt and
Villamil [9]). Harrison [19] employed a random tie breaking rule in a study of
contestable markets. Tie breaking rules have been introduced as treatment
variables by Davis and Wilson (see [10]) in a variant of posted-offer trading
rules appropriate to a procurement auction environment. In their experiment,
every market lasts for forty trading periods and consists of four sellers. One
of their findings is that a change in the tie-breaking rule does not affect be-
havior. This result, as mentioned by the authors themselves, might be driven
by some features of their design which is rather elaborate. Our study seems
to support their conjecture since it shows that tie breaking rules matter in a
very simple environment (e.g., in our study markets are duopolistic and the
induced demand and supply arrays are simpler than the ones in [10]).
On the other hand, as far as divisibility is concerned, lower divisibility
generates a simplification of the price decision space. The latter has been
examined in contestable markets by Brown-Kruse [3]. In this study, sellers’
offers are restricted to multiples of 0.25 in one of the treatments. Under this
restriction, the strategy space shrinks from 250 choices to 10 choices. In this
work, a less complex specification of the choice space allows sellers to identify
alternative strategies of tacit collusion, even if the impact on mean prices is
not significant. They conjecture that one of the reasons why the results are
not significant might rely on the specification of the design generating losses
for sellers in case of price ties.9 Note that in our environment, as opposed to
theirs, sellers do not incur any loss in case of a price tie.
Thus, the contribution of our paper, relative to the existing literature, is
to investigate the effect of tie breaking rules and the effect of a simplification
of the choice space of sellers (on pricing and collusive behavior) in duopoly
posted offer markets.
3 Equilibrium Distributions
The model consists of a finitely repeated game. The stage game is described as
follows. There are two identical firms producing a homogeneous good whose
9“Under the decreasing average costs of a natural monopoly, if sellers match prices and
share the market, this can result in substantial losses when prices are near the competitive
range” ([3], p.144).
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demand curve is
q(p) =


0 if p > 550
6 if 0 ≤ p ≤ 550.
Each firm has a capacity constraint of 4. The cost of production is 41 per unit
and production is to-order as sellers incur costs only if a unit is sold. Firms
simultaneously choose prices and quantities. That is, each seller has a two
dimensional strategy space B = P ×Q, where Q = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, and chooses
a price and a quantity ((p, q) ∈ B = P ×Q) . We will consider two games
whose distinction trait is the price space, namely, either P = PC = [0, 10000]
or P = PLD = {0, 50, ..., 10000} .
10
Note that it is a dominant strategy for every firm to post prices exceeding
41 and offer all the units available for sale. Thus, we can treat this game
as if the strategy space is in fact one dimensional and firms simultaneously
choose only prices. If prices are unequal, the low-price firm sells 4 units and
the high-price firm sells the remaining 2 units. If firms choose the same price,
i.e., in case of a price tie, either they share the market equally, or the seller
to be approached first is chosen randomly. Under the assumption that firms
are risk neutral, the payoff functions are given by the following expression for
i = 1, 2:
ui(p1, p2) =


(pi − 41)× 4 if pi < pj , pi ≤ 550
(pi − 41)× 3 if pi = pj , pi ≤ 550
(pi − 41)× 2 if pi > pj , pi ≤ 550
0 if pi > 550
Before characterizing the Nash Equilibrium for this game for both PC =
[0, 10000] and PLD = {0, 50, ..., 10000}, let us make a few remarks.
In both cases the competitive equilibrium (p = 41 and quantity demanded
= 6) is not a Nash equilibrium, since either of the sellers can profit from a
unilateral deviation, i.e., there is static market power. Specifically, we will see
that because of market power the noncooperative equilibrium for the market
game leads to a cycle of prices that exceed the competitive level (e.g., see
[20]). Furthermore, no pure strategy Nash Equilibrium exists in this game
and noncooperative firms randomize to avoid being slightly undercut in the
10The last paragraph preceding Subsection 3.1 contains more details regarding the choice
of the parameters of the model.
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cycle. There is a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in both cases
that requires mixing over the range of the Edgeworth cycle.11 Notice that
in our case, the support of the distribution coincides with the range of the
Edgeworth cycle. (See [21].)
Since the stage game has a unique equilibrium, by backward induction the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game is to play the static
equilibrium in every subgame.
The parameters of the model (costs, limit price, etc.) are chosen so that
the equilibria of the two games (C and LD) are not too different. For exam-
ple, not only do both games admit a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies,
but also the Edgeworth cycle intervals are very close ([295.5, 550] in C and
[300, 550] in LD). We think this is a better fit to the study of divisibility per
se, since it helps us isolate the effects of divisibility.
3.1 Equilibrium in the continuum case
In this section, we let PC = [0, 10000] . The noncooperative equilibrium in-
volves randomization over the range of prices called “Edgeworth cycle.” The
support of the noncooperative equilibrium distribution is determined as fol-
lows. The upper end of the range of the Edgeworth cycle is 550. At a price
of 550, the residual demand is of two units, so that either seller can secure
himself a profit of 2[550 − 41] = 1018. If a seller chooses a price of 550, the
other seller’s best response is to post a price just below it and sell four units.
Best responses consist in undercutting until a price of 295.5 is reached. In
fact, selling four units at a price below 295.5 is not as profitable as selling two
units at a price of 550 (4[295.5− 41] = 1018).
Let G(p) denote the probability that the price p posted by seller i is the
highest price posted in the market for a period. Since any two sellers in a
market have identical profit functions, we will focus on a symmetric mixed
equilibrium, so that G(p) can be considered as the common price distribu-
tion. Furthermore, note in this game there is a unique equilibrium in mixed
strategies and that the probability of a price tie is zero (for a proof see [27]
and [12]). If a price p is the highest price, the seller who posted it will sell
two units and will earn H(p) = 2[p−41]. On the other hand, if p is the lowest
11Each period each firm posts a price slightly below the prices posted in the previous
period. Eventually prices decrease to a level where a firm’s best response is to charge the
monopoly price for the residual demand. The other firms follow and a new price cycle
begins.
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price, the seller will sell four units and his earnings are L(p) = 4[p − 41].
Hence, the expected profit for a seller is given by
G(p)H(p) + (1−G(p))L(p).
Next, observe that sellers must be indifferent over all prices in the support of
the distribution, and they can secure themselves a profit of 1018 by choosing
a price of 550. By substituting for the expression H(p) and L(p), we obtain
G(p)2[p− 41] + (1−G(p))4[p− 41] = 1018.
Solving for G(p) we have the equilibrium cumulative distribution function of
prices
G(p) =


0 if 0 < p ≤ 295.5
591−2p
41−p if 295.5 ≤ p ≤ 550,
whose density function is g(p) = 509
(41−p)2
, for 295.5 ≤ p ≤ 550.
300 350 400 450 500 550
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
p
g(p)
Figure 1. Density function in the continuum case.
The equilibrium density function has no probability mass point. The
intuition is that, since the equilibrium is symmetric, if the density function
admits probability mass points, then each seller has the incentive to undercut
at the common mass point, contradicting the notion of equilibrium.
3.2 Equilibrium in the discrete case
Now, let PLD = {0, 50, ..., 10000} , i.e., sellers are allowed to post only prices
that are multiples of 50. We now deal with a finite game so that there exists
an equilibrium. With the help of specialized software (see either [26] or [29])
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we are able to find the equilibrium in mixed strategies. Furthermore, the
equilibrium is unique and it is symmetric. The equilibrium probability dis-
tribution assigns zero probability to all prices below 300, and it is described
next.
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Figure 2. Equilibrium distribution in the discrete case.
A comparison of Figures 1 and 2 suggests that in the continuum case
the probability distribution is slightly more skewed to the left than in the
discrete case. Also, the probability that a tie occurs is zero in the continuum
case (since there are no mass points), while it is positive in the discrete case
(at least for prices greater than 300).
3.3 Collusive Equilibria
Theoretically, collusion is not an equilibrium of our finite horizon games but
behaviorally repeated game effects are possible.12 Thus, we comment briefly
on the existence of subgame perfect equilibria of the infinitely repeated coun-
terpart of our games. In particular, we focus on the perfectly collusive equilib-
rium which we consider as a benchmark. Standard Folk Theorem arguments
show that, in order to sustain perfect collusion as an equilibrium in the contin-
uum and less divisible cases, the discount rate or probability of continuation
should exceed 0.499 and 0.43, respectively.13 This suggests that is more dif-
ficult to sustain collusion under the continuum than under the less divisible
12The time horizon of sixty periods in the experiment may be long enough to make
repeated game effects possible.
13This equilibrium is sustained by a trigger strategy: each player colludes until someone
fails to collude, which triggers a switch to the noncooperative Nash equilibrium forever
after. Here, we focused on the sustainibility of perfect collusion as a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game. Note that other feasible payoffs can be obtained
in subgame perfect equilibria (for sufficienlty high probabilities of continuation). That is,
the set of noncooperative equilibria includes cooperative outcomes that are not repetitions
of Nash equilibria of the stage game.
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space. This result is intuitive since the gains from undercutting (i.e., devi-
ating from perfect collusion) are higher under the continuum than under the
less divisible space.14
3.4 Summary of Equilibrium Predictions
Under risk neutrality, the choice of the tie breaking rule does not affect Nash
equilibrium predictions. Consequently, based on the previous sections, we
can summarize the equilibrium predictions in Table I. For completeness, we
include also the predictions from perfectly collusive behavior.15
Mean Price Median Price St. Dev. Profit/Period
Perfectly Collusive 550 550 0 1527
Nash Equ. (Continuum) 393.81 380.33 71.16 1018
Nash Equ. (LD) 427.67 400 75.44 1118.69
Table I. Theoretical predictions.
From a qualitative standpoint the static Nash equilibrium predicts the
following differences under the two divisibility regimes:
Hypothesis 1. A change in the tie-breaking rule does not affect the equi-
librium predictions (under risk neutrality).
Hypothesis 2. Mean and median prices are higher under the Less Divisible
regime than under the Continuum one.
Hypothesis 3. Price dispersion is higher under LD than under C.
Hypothesis 4. Equilibrium profit is higher under LD than under C.
Before testing for these hypotheses (in Section 5) let us describe the ex-
perimental design.
14This effect dominates over the one arising from the fact that the punishment from
reverting to the noncooperative Nash equilibrium is harsher under the continuum than
under the less divisible treatment.
15Perfectly collusive profits are per seller profits associated with the limit price.
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4 Experimental Design and Procedures
Every market consisted of sixty trading periods during which pairs remained
fixed. Supply and demand arrays for each market are shown in Figure 3.
 
S u p p l y  a n d  D e m a n d
0
5 0
1 0 0
1 5 0
2 0 0
2 5 0
3 0 0
3 5 0
4 0 0
4 5 0
5 0 0
5 5 0
6 0 0
6 5 0
0 2 4 6 8 1 0
S u p p ly
D e m a n d
Figure 3. Induced supply and demand arrays.
Note that the two sellers in every market were symmetric. They had
identical costs and identical capacity constraints, i.e., they both were endowed
with four units at a cost of 41 each.16
All markets were conducted under posted-offer rules with a simulated, fully
revealing buyer. In every period, sellers simultaneously made price/quantity
decisions in each market. Every seller was allowed to post only one price at
which he was willing to sell the posted units. After all prices were posted,
the simulated buyer purchased up to six units in each market at prices up to
550 (and no units at a price exceeding 550). The buyer made all profitable
purchases, buying first from the seller with the lowest posted price, then from
the other seller.
Sellers were fully informed about other seller’s cost, about the preferences
and shopping behavior of the simulated buyer, and about the matching proto-
col. Production was to-order as sellers incurred costs only if a unit was sold.
Thus, the payoff for every seller was given by
Payoff = [(selling price×number of units sold)-(production cost of units sold)].
We adopted two treatment variables. The first treatment variable changed
the rules according to which the simulated buyer made purchases in the event
of a price tie. In case of identical prices, in design S (S for sharing) the buyer
16For an explanation regarding the choice of the parameters values, see the paragraph
preceding Subsection 3.1.
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equalized purchases among the tied sellers, while in design R (R for random),
the buyer chose randomly which seller to approach first.17
The second treatment variable dealt with the divisibility of sellers’ strategy
space (modeled by making each seller’s strategy space coarser or finer).
In the Continuum treatment, sellers were allowed to post prices that were
numbers up to three decimal places, while in the Less Divisible treatment,
sellers were allowed to post only prices that were multiples of 50. That is,
in the Continuum treatment (C thereafter) p ∈ P˜C = [0, 0.001, ..., 10000] and
q ∈ Q = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. On the other hand, in the Less Divisible treatment
(LD), p ∈ PLD = [0, 50, ..., 10000] and q ∈ Q = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} .
18
We conducted fifty-six homogeneous-product duopoly markets, run in ten
sessions with 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16 participants (see Table II).19
The experiments are divided into four cells based on the two treatment
conditions.
Continuum (C) Less Divisible (LD)
Sharing (S) 7 markets (1 session) 16 markets (3 sessions)
Random (R) 16 markets (3 sessions) 17 markets (3 sessions)
Table II. Matrix of treatments and sessions summary.
Note that the matrix in Table II also displays the number of sessions
run under each treatment. All the sessions took place at the Vernon Smith
Experimental Economics Laboratory at Purdue University. The experiment
was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (See [16]). Subjects
for the experiments were recruited from undergraduate students at Purdue
University. Subjects were inexperienced, where experience refers to previous
participation in one or more of the posted offer experiments.20 Instructions
17 In case of risk neutrality of the sellers this treatment variable does not affect the out-
come. Under risk aversion and discrete strategy space, on the other hand, this might affect
behavior. Indeed, note that if two sellers price tie between 50 and 550 and post four units
each, then under S they will sell three units each, while under R, one of them (randomly
selected) will sell four, and the other only two.
18 In both treatments the price space is large, even though participants should not price
above 550. The intention is not to impose any ex ante restriction on the participants’ pricing
behavior (reflected also in the instructions that do not mention any upper bound for the
price space). It might be worth noticing that none of the posted prices exceeded 10000.
19Seven markets (1 session) have been conducted under the Sharing Continuum treatment.
The purpose of this session is to check whether, given the sharing tie breaking rule, tacit
perfect collusion survives under the continuum (price) strategy space.
20On the other hand, if by experience we mean previous participation to any type of
11
were read aloud to participants as they followed along in their own copies.21
Subjects were given explicit information regarding the purchasing decision of
the simulated buyer as well as the fact that sellers were identical. Further-
more, they were told that they were paired with the same person throughout
the whole experiment,22 that the experiment would consist of 60 periods23
and would run for up to one hour and a half. A typical experiment lasted
about an hour. Earnings ranged between $11 and $22 per subject. Average
earnings were $15.95.
5 Experimental Results
In this section, we will adopt the following notation:
rc = random tie breaking rule and continuum price space
rld = random tie breaking rule and less divisible price space
sc = sharing tie breaking rule and continuum price space
sld = sharing tie breaking rule and less divisible price space.
Before providing a detailed discussion of our results, let us point out that in
our experiment markets consisted of fixed pairs, so that we can treat markets
as statistically independent observations. This is important for nonparametric
tests, where we use exactly one summary statistic value for each market.
That is, the number of observations in each treatment is given by Nrc = 16,
Nrld = 17, Nsc = 7, and Nsld = 16.
For the sake of completeness, we tested our hypotheses by using the price
medians as well as the mean posted prices.24 The most important conclusions
of our analysis are derived from mean and median posted prices, from a
regression analysis and from a probit model.
economics experiment, our subjects were experienced. As a matter of fact, two sessions
were run with subjects who had never participated before to any type of experiment. The
results from these sessions appear significantly different from the ones obtained from the
others, suggesting the introduction of a third (experience) treatment variable, that goes
beyond the scope of this study.
21The instructions for the treatments Sharing Less Divisible, Random Less Divisible and
Random Continuum are contained in Appendix B. The instructions for the treatment Shar-
ing Continuum is obtained as an obvious modification of the ones included.
22Note that participants were seated at visually isolated booths.
23That is, the stopping rule of 60 periods was publicly announced.
24Note that the noncooperative equilibrium predictions for the one-shot game regard
posted prices.
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When prices are pooled within each treatment, the median prices for pe-
riods 11-6025 are plotted in Figure 2A (in Appendix A). Figure 3A (also in
Appendix A) plots mean prices in 10 period intervals pooled by treatments.26
The data are characterized by the following features:
(i) In all treatments, prices do not follow a specific monotonic trend, but
they exhibit an unstable pattern.
(ii) The quantitative theoretical predictions are rejected by the data.
Mean and median market prices are higher than predicted by the nonco-
operative Nash Equilibrium and lower than monopolistic ones, in all four
treatments.27
(iii) The treatment sld is characterized by the highest incidence of median
prices equal to 550.
The next sections contain a more detailed analysis of the data by focusing
first on the results regarding tie breaking rules, and then on the results related
to divisibility.
5.1 Tie Breaking Rules
Does a change in the tie breaking rule affect pricing behavior? Recall that un-
der the assumption of risk-neutrality, tie breaking rules (since we are dealing
with duopolies) should not affect prices. On the other hand, our data analysis
seems to support the opposite. In what follows, we focus on the effect of tie
breaking rules on perfect tacit collusion (Section 5.1.1), as well as on posted
prices (Section 5.1.2).
In order to study the effect of tie breaking rules on perfect tacit collusion,
we analyze the data collected under the less divisible (LD) and continuum
(C) treatments.28
5.1.1 Perfect tacit collusion
In this section we test the following Hypothesis.
25We chose to focus on this range to account for some initial noise and end-game effects.
26We pooled mean prices by 10 period intervals since it makes easier comparisons across
treatments.
27According to the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. That is, we tested whether a particular
random sample came from a population with a specified mean or median (see [7], Chapter
5). Here, the random sample is given by individual markets mean or median of prices posted
after period 10, i.e., we have one summary statistic value per market. The specified mean
or median is given by the theoretically predicted values of Table I.
28Recall that fewer observations were collected under the continuum with sharing tie
breaking rule treatment, relative to the other treatments.
13
Hypothesis 1. A change in the tie breaking rule does not affect the equi-
librium predictions under risk neutrality.
This hypothesis seems not to be supported by the data. Indeed, tie break-
ing rules affect the rates of perfect tacit collusion. In particular, perfect tacit
collusion, captured by ties at 550 (i.e., both sellers post a price equal to 550),
occurs more frequently under the sharing tie breaking rule (see Figure 4).
Percentage of Ties at p= 550
8%
32%
1%
15%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Random Less
Divisible
Sharing Less
Divisible
Random Continuum Sharing Continuum
Figure 4. Percentages of Ties at 550 pooled by treatments.
For instance, a look at Figure 5 shows that when the sharing rule is employed
and prices are less divisible, 7 markets (out of 16 markets) converged to perfect
collusion for 21, 21, 27, 40, 41, 49, and 54 consecutive periods respectively.29
In five of them perfect collusion was broken in the last period, and in two of
them in the last two periods, providing some evidence of endgame behavior.
On the other hand, when the random rule is employed, perfect collusion was
sustained by only one of the 17 markets (with 16 consecutive ties), and in
some others it was attempted without success.
29This provides us with the highest number of consecutive ties. The total number of ties
for these markets were 28, 41, 43, 43, 44, 49, 54, respectively.
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Figure 5. Markets exhibiting tacit perfect collusion under the sharing and random
(less divisible) treatments.
When prices are more divisible, 3 out of 7 markets converged to perfect
collusion30 under the sharing tie breaking rule, while none of the 16 markets
did under the random one. It seems that the sharing tie breaking rule fa-
cilitates perfect collusion, regardless of the degree of divisibility of the price
space. Perfect collusion might be slightly more fragile under a continuum
price space but still survives (see Figure 4).
Furthermore, markets under the sharing rule exhibit a more stable pattern
of perfect collusion since the latter is sustained except for the very last periods.
For instance, one of the markets converged to perfect collusion after the first
five periods and remained there until the last period. On the other hand,
when the random rule is employed, perfect collusion is more unstable, i.e., it
is broken and resumed several times. Also, it seems to be sustained in only
one market, where the longest sequence of 16 ties occurs in the last twenty
periods.31 That is, the random rule makes perfect collusion more difficult to
be attained and, in case of success, more fragile.
30To be precise, one of the three markets displayed “almost perfect” collusion, in the sense
that one seller posted 3 units for sale at a price of 549, and the other seller posted 4 units
at 550. It involved 26 periods (periods 34-59).
31Under the random less divisible treatment three markets tied for 12, 15 and 27 periods,
but not consecutively. In particular, the longest sequences consisted of 4, 6 and 16 ties
respectively. In the former two markets, perfect collusion was broken in the second half of
the experiment. In the latter market, the longest sequence of ties (16) occurred in the last
twenty periods.
15
To test for the effect of tie breaking rules on perfect collusion, we calculated
for each market both the total number of price ties at 550 and the highest
number of consecutive ties at 550.32 We think that the latter number is a
more accurate measure of perfect collusion, since it is better suited to capture
the willingness to collude (it is less sensitive to scattered random ties). Table
IA in Appendix A contains information both on the total number of ties and
the highest number of consecutive ties, for every market in every treatment. A
Mann-Whitney two-tailed test carried on individual markets’ highest number
of consecutive ties confirms that perfect collusion is significantly higher under
the sharing tie breaking rule than under the random one when the price space
is less divisible (p-value= 0.06). Under the continuum treatment this effect is
not significant.33
This suggests that perfect collusion is more likely when the sharing tie
breaking rule is employed. To estimate the likelihood of perfect collusion
(i.e., price ties at 550) in the last thirty periods we employ a probit model.
Probit analysis is conducted using the following random effects model:
Ties30i,t = β0 + β1Ties30i,t−1 + β2s30i,t + εi,t,
where i refers to markets and t to periods. We use a random effects specifi-
cation to account for unobserved markets heterogeneity.34
We focus on the effect of tie breaking rules on the probability of perfect
collusion in the last thirty periods. We run two separate regressions to account
for the two different levels of divisibility, i.e., less divisible and continuum. So,
given a divisibility level, the dependent variable Ties30i,t is a binary variable
capturing perfect collusion, and it is equal to 1 in case of a tie at 550 and 0
otherwise. The explanatory variables are Ties30i,t−1 (i.e., the lagged variable
of Ties30i,t), that accounts for whether there was perfect collusion or not in
32 In a given period, an observation qualifies as a price tie at 550 if both sellers posted
a price of 550. Thus, for a market, the highest number of consecutive ties at 550 is the
longest sequence of consecutive periods where both sellers in that market posted the joint
profit maximizing price of 550.
33Recall that we are using one summary statistic value for each market. This result
might be due to the low number of observations collected under the sharing continuum
treatment. Furthermore, note that if we include in our analysis the market that colluded
almost perfectly (see footnote 30), this effect is significant also for the continuum treatment
(Mann-Whitney, p-value=0.08).
34The individual effect in our case can be assumed to be uncorrelated with the regressors.
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the previous period, and s30i,t which is a dummy variable whose value is 1 if
the market is under the sharing treatment.
Dependent variable: tacit perfect collusion
Random effects probit
Less Divisible Continuum
Constant (β0) −2.33
∗∗∗
(0.42)
−3.13∗∗∗
(0.34)
Perfect collusion last period (β1) 1.18
∗∗∗
(0.21)
1.29∗∗∗
(0.31)
Sharing dummy (β2) 1.57
(0.60)
∗∗∗ 1.32∗∗
(0.61)
Wald χ2(2) 41.50∗∗∗ 22.50∗∗
Marginal effects of sharing dummy 0.30∗∗ 0.042
Obs. 957 667
Table III. Random effects probit results on perfect collusion.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
***Statistically significant at 1% level. **Statistically significant at 5% level.
The results reported in Table III provide evidence that inertia (β1) and
the sharing tie breaking rule (β2) affect significantly the probability of per-
fect collusion in the last thirty periods, under both divisibility treatments.35
Nonetheless, the effect of the sharing tie breaking rule is stronger under the
less divisible price space. In fact, the marginal effects on the probit regression
indicate that the sharing tie breaking rule significantly increases the prob-
ability of perfect collusion by 30% under the less divisible price space. On
the other hand, this increase is 4.2% under the continuum one, and it is not
significant.
Using our results from the nonparametric and parametric analysis of our
data we draw the following conclusion.
Conclusion: Tacit perfect collusion is significantly higher in the Sharing
treatment than in the Random one.
35The null that the appropriate model contains only a constant is rejected (see the Wald
χ2(2) in the table). Alternative specifications do not change our conclusion. For example,
this specification is robust to omitting the lagged dependent variable, and probit results are
robust to assumptions about within-market correlation (that takes care of the fact that in
our data consecutive observations within the same market are not independent).
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This result seems to suggest that it is easier for subjects to coordinate
their actions when coordination involves the choice of only one variable (e.g.,
price) rather than two variables (e.g., price and quantity). In fact, sellers can
achieve equal profits and perfect collusion under both tie breaking rules. The
only difference is that under the sharing rule it is sufficient that subjects post
the same price (equal to 550), while under the random one, subjects should
additionally restrict the number of units posted for sale. For example, if two
subjects tie at a price of 550, then they sell three units each under the sharing
tie breaking rule (getting a profit of 1527 each). To obtain the same outcome
under the random tie breaking rule, not only each subject should post a price
of 550, but also he should post a quantity equal to 3.
This observation motivates us to have a closer look at quantity restrictions
below capacity, i.e., below 4 units.36 In order to investigate whether subjects
attempted to coordinate and share through output restrictions, we calculate
the longest sequence of consecutive periods where output was restricted below
4 units. We use the longest sequence of periods rather than the total number
of periods since we think it is a more accurate measure of the willingness to
coordinate and share. We calculate this number for every seller so that, at
the market level, this produces two numbers. We pick the largest of the two,
which gives the longest sequence of consecutive periods with quantity restric-
tions for every market, i.e., we have one summary statistic value for every
market.37 For every treatment, according to the Wilcoxon test, the median
of the distribution of the longest sequence of consecutive periods with output
rationing is significantly greater than zero, where zero corresponds to no out-
put restrictions. Thus, there is evidence that subjects tried to coordinate by
limiting their output, in all treatments.38
Furthermore, if we further restrict our attention to sequences that exceed
3 consecutive periods,39 13 out of 33 markets attempted to coordinate and
36We thank a referee for this suggestion.
37Note that we do not use the number of periods where both sellers were simultaneously
rationing their output since the occurrence of such an event was very rare. That is, in most
cases, output rationing was unilateral.
38Recall that Nsc = 7, Nsld = 16, Nrc = 16, and Nrld = 17. This result is significant
at the 1% level in all treatments but sc, where it is significant at the 5% level. It is also
confirmed by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test comparing the empirical distribution of the
sample with a theoretical distribution which is degenerate at 0 (corresponding to no output
restrictions).
39Since output rationing is not necessarily observable by sellers, the longer is the sequence
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share under the random rule treatment (8 under the less divisible price space
and 5 under the more divisible one). Under the sharing treatment, 8 out
of 23 markets attempted to collude through quantity restrictions (7 under
the less divisible space and 1 under the more divisible one). This analysis
indicates that subjects tried to coordinate and share by rationing their output.
Notice that regardless of whether the output rationing was visible40 or not
to the competitor, it did not facilitate perfect collusion in the random rule
treatment,41 suggesting that coordination requiring output rationing is more
difficult to achieve.
5.1.2 Prices
The empirical distributions of posted prices are different under the two tie
breaking rules (see also Figure 1A in Appendix A). For instance, the frequency
of prices equal to 550 is 43.7 under the sharing tie breaking rule, and 26.08
under the random one (given a less divisible price space).
The effects of tie breaking rules on prices is not as clear-cut as those on
collusion. Tie braking rules seem to have opposite effects depending on the
divisibility of the price space (see Figure 3b and Figure 3d in Appendix A).
To test for these effects we employ both nonparametric and parametric
analysis. To carry nonparametric tests, we use as observations the mean of
prices posted after period ten in each individual market. That is, we use
prices posted in each individual market and we average them over periods
11-60, so that we have exactly one summary statistic value for each market.42
We find that, when the price space is less divisible, market means are mar-
ginally significantly higher under the sharing rule than under the random one
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p-value=0.09). When the price space is continuum,
we have the opposite (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p-value=0.08).43
We investigate the effects of tie breaking rules on posted prices also by
using a subject-specific regression model. Since observations from the two
of consecutive periods where it occurs, the stronger may be the willingness to signal a desire
for cooperation.
40The number of units posted for sale was not displayed on the competitor’s screen. So,
unilateral output restrictions could have been inferred only indirectly. For example, if the
seller restricting the output also posted a lower price.
41Only one market converged to perfect collusion under the random rule treatment, and
it did not exhibit output rationing.
42Recall that Nrld = 17, Nsld = 16, Nrc = 16, and Nsc = 7.
43The tests on market medians have the same direction but are not significant.
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sellers in one market are highly dependent and consecutive observations over
time are not independent, we accounted for cross-sectional correlation and
heteroskedasticity across panels, as well as autocorrelation within panels.
The statistics are calculated by running a regression with posted price as
the dependent variable. Dummy variables and the inverse of the time period
are the explanatory variables. The regression makes use of all the price data
except for period 1 and the last two periods.44 We estimate the following
model
pit = α0 + α1(1/t) + α2rcit + α3sldit + α4scit + εit.
where i refers to individual sellers and t to time periods.
The variable (1/t) is an explanatory variable equal to the inverse of the
trading period. We employ four dummy variables, one, rcit, is equal to 1
if the price is observed under the treatment with random tie breaking rule
and continuum choice space, while sldit is 1 if the price is observed under
the treatment with sharing tie breaking rule and less divisible choice space.
Similarly, the dummy variable scit equals 1 if the posted price is observed in
the treatment with sharing tie breaking rule and continuum choice space.45
The next table contains the results of our estimation. Standard errors are
printed below the coefficient estimates.
Dependent variable: posted price
α0 α1(1/t) α2(rc) α3(sld) α4(sc)
440.30
(1.29)
∗∗∗ −152.40
(7.02)
∗∗∗ 17.93
(1.69)
∗∗∗ 27.64
(2.31)
∗∗∗ −16.26
(3.14)
∗∗∗
***Statistically significant at 1% level. Obs.=6384. χ2(4) = 681.21.
Table IV. Regression results on posted prices.
The negative and significant coefficient on t implies an upward trend in
prices for the early periods. The positive and significant coefficient on sld
indicates that sellers under the sharing tie breaking rule posted higher prices
than the ones posted by sellers under the random one (given the less divis-
ible choice space). On the other hand, a look at the difference between the
coefficient estimates of rc and sc, suggests the opposite under the continuum
44We excluded the first and last periods to account for noise and endgame effects, respec-
tively. This procedure is used in the analysis of panel data in experimental economics (e.g.,
[4]). Excluding the first ten periods does not change the results qualitatively.
45The dummy variable rldit is the omitted category.
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treatment.46 This suggests that pricing behavior tends to be affected by the
tie breaking rule.
Conclusion: Sellers tend to post higher prices under the sharing tie break-
ing rule than under the random one under the less divisible regime, and the
reverse under the continuum.
5.2 Divisibility
What about the effect of divisibility on tacit perfect collusion? It seems to
strengthen the incidence of tacit perfect collusion. When the sharing tie-
breaking rule is employed, the percentage of price ties at 550 is 32% under
the less divisible space and 15% under the continuum (see Figure 4).
Also, the fraction of markets that exhibited tacit perfect collusion is 7/16
under the less divisible space and 3/7 under the continuum (under the sharing
tie breaking rule). Under the continuum treatment tacit perfect collusion still
survives but is more fragile.47
This is confirmed also by the probit analysis provided in Table III. In
particular, the sharing tie breaking rule significantly increases the probability
of perfect collusion by 30% under the less divisible price space. This increase
is 4.2% under the continuum one, and it is not significant.
The effect of divisibility on posted prices is less clear-cut. To see this,
following the Nash Equilibrium prediction (See Table I), we test three hy-
potheses.
Hypothesis 2: Mean and median prices are higher under the Less Divisible
regime than under the Continuum one.
The results are not conclusive. For instance, a look at Figure 6 suggests
that this hypothesis is not supported by the data, under the random rule.
46The qualitative results of our estimation are robust to the addition of the lagged de-
pendent variable as explanatory variable.
47For example, in one of the markets in the continuum treatment tacit perfect collusion
exhibited an unstable pattern: sellers would break collusion with a cyclicality of few periods,
would punish each other, and would resume collusion again.
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Figure 6. Mean Prices in ten period intervals.
To test for this hypothesis, we calculated the mean and median of prices
posted after period ten,48 so that we have exactly one observation per market.
Even though markets’ mean prices are not significantly different, median
market prices are significantly higher under rc than under rld (according to
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p-value=0.03).49 However, under the sharing rule,
median and mean market prices tend to be-not significantly- higher when the
space is less divisible (see also Figures 2c and 3c in Appendix A).50
According to parametric analysis, the positive coefficient on rc in Table
IV confirms that sellers under the continuum choice space tend to post higher
prices than under the less divisible choice space, given the random tie breaking
rule. Under the sharing tie breaking rule, the opposite is true.
The intuition behind these results might be that, under the random rule,
the continuum price space allows sellers to gently shade each other while the
less divisible price space leads to abrupt undercutting behavior. On the other
hand, given the sharing tie breaking rule, collusion occurs more frequently
when the space is less divisible.
Hypothesis 3: Price dispersion is higher under LD than under C.
This hypothesis does not receive strong support. The units of observa-
tion are the standard deviations of prices posted in every market with the
48We did not include the first ten periods to account for noisy behavior in the initial
periods.
49The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is a two-sample test of equality of distributions. The
p-value of 0.03 refers to the combined test. According to the Mann-Whitney tests there is
no significant difference.
50This effect is not significant (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p-value=0.69)
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exclusion of the first 10 periods.51 The Mann-Whitney test fails to reject the
null hypothesis that there is no difference between market prices standard
deviations in the less divisible treatment versus the continuum one, both un-
der the random tie breaking rule (p-value=0.80) and under the sharing one
(p-value=0.14).52
Hypothesis 4: Equilibrium profit is higher under LD than under C.
This hypothesis is not supported by the data as well. Individual markets
average profits are not significantly different across divisibility levels, given a
tie breaking rule.53
Conclusion: None of the theoretical predictions regarding divisibility is
strongly supported by the data. For instance, under the random tie breaking
rule, prices tend to be higher under the continuum regime than under the less
divisible one.
6 Conclusions
We examine the effect of a change in tie breaking rules and divisibility on
prices in simple experimental duopoly markets with posted prices and simu-
lated buyer behavior. We explore two possible tie breaking rules, sharing and
random, and we model a change in divisibility by making the sellers’ price
space finer or coarser.
Theoretically, in our duopoly model, prices should be affected by divisi-
bility but not by tie breaking rules. Our results show that a change in the tie
breaking rule significantly affects pricing behavior. In particular, the sharing
tie breaking rule facilitates tacit perfect collusion. Moreover, we find some
evidence that in our design divisibility has an opposite effect than predicted
by the Nash equilibrium, under the random tie breaking rule. This might
be driven by the fact that, under a random tie breaking rule, the continuum
51We excluded the prices posted in the first 10 periods to account for noisy behavior.
52 If we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, this is the case under the random rule. On
the other hand, under the sharing rule, standard deviations are significantly lower when the
price space is less divisible (p-value= 0.07).
53 In particular, contrary to the hypothesis, when the random rule is employed, they tend
to be lower under the less divisible than under the continuum space.
This difference is not significant under both Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov
two-sample tests. Here, the two samples are given by individual markets average profits
under the two divisibility treatments, given the tie breaking rule. That is, Nrld = 17 and
Nrc = 16 in one comparison, while Nsld = 16 and Nsc = 7, in the other one.
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choice space allows sellers to smoothly undercut each other and consequently
keep higher prices by slowing down the Edgeworth cycle.
The result regarding tie breaking rules is striking since, in our game, a
strategy supporting perfect collusion where sellers make equal profits can be
chosen under both tie breaking rules. Under the sharing tie breaking rule it
is sufficient that subjects post the same prices, while under the random one,
subjects should additionally restrict the number of units posted for sale. For
example, if two sellers tie at a price of 550, then they would sell three units
each under the sharing tie breaking rule (getting a profit of 1527 each). To
obtain the same outcome under the random tie breaking rule, not only each
seller should post a price of 550, but also a quantity equal to 3.
That is, in our environment, perfect collusion is facilitated when subjects
have to worry about coordinating only on the choice of one variable (the price)
rather than the choice of two variables (both price and quantity). Thus, from
the behavioral viewpoint, tie breaking rules affect coordination incentives,
and, consequently, also collusion incentives.
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Appendix A 
 
rld (17 Markets) sld (16 Markets) rc (16 Markets) sc (7 Markets) 
Ties Longest 
Sequence 
Of Ties 
Ties Longest 
Sequence 
Of Ties 
Ties Longest 
Sequence 
Of Ties 
Ties Longest 
Sequence 
Of Ties 
0 0 28 27 0 0 12 4 
15 6 4 1 0 0 51 49 
6 4 44 21 0 0 0 0 
3 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 
27 16 49 49 2 1  01 0 
8 2 54 54 0 0 0  0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 
12 4 2 1 9 5   
4 1 1 1 0 0   
0 0 1 1 3 3   
3 1 43 40 0 0   
0 0 2 1 0 0   
0 0 43 21 1 0   
2 2 41 41 0 0   
1 1 1 1 0 0   
1 1 1 1 0 0   
3 1       
 
Table IA. Total number of ties and highest number of consecutive ties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 This market exhibited almost perfect collusion, since one seller consistently posted a price of 549 and a 
quantity of 3, while the other posted a price of 550 and a quantity of 4. If we count the periods when almost 
perfect collusion took place, both the number of Ties and the Longest Sequence of Ties would be 26. 
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Figure 1A. Percentages of observed prices under the less divisible treatment. 
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2b) Random Less Divisible vs. Sharing Less Divisible 
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2c) Sharing Less Divisible vs. Sharing Continuum 
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2d) Sharing Continuum vs. Random Continuum 
 
 
Figure 2A.  Median Prices for periods 11-60 pooled by treatment. 
 
 
 
10 period mean prices
445
450
455
460
465
470
475
480
485
11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60
period
1
0
 p
e
ri
o
d
 m
e
a
n
 p
ri
c
e
Random Continuum
Random Less
Divisible
 
 
3a) Random Continuum vs. Random Less Divisible 
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3b) Sharing Less Divisible vs. Random Less Divisible 
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3c) Sharing Less Divisible vs. Sharing Continuum 
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3d) Sharing Continuum vs. Random Continuum  
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3e) All treatments 
 
 
Figure 3A. Ten period mean prices pooled by treatments. 
 33 
Appendix B 
 
Instructions 
 
General 
 This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The 
instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you 
will earn money that will be paid to you privately in cash. All earnings in your computer 
screens are in Experimental Dollars. These Experimental Dollars will be converted to real 
Dollars at the end of the experiment, at a rate of ________ Experimental Dollars = 1 real 
Dollar. 
We are going to conduct a set of markets in which you will be a participant in a sequence 
of 60 trading periods where you can sell units of a good X.  There are two sellers in every 
market. You will be a seller in today’s experiment, and you will remain in this role 
throughout the experiment. During each trading period you will be free to sell units of the 
good X as you choose. Sellers earn money from selling units that cost a known amount.  
Attached to these instructions you will find a sheet labeled Personal Record Sheet, which 
will also help you keep track of your earnings based on the decisions you might make. 
You are not to reveal this information to anyone. It is your own private information.  
 
PERIODS 1-60 
Buyers 
The buyers’ side of the market in today’s experiment is simulated by a computer.  
There is a single buyer. The buyer will make purchases according to the following rules. 
 
1) The buyer will purchase a total of 6 units, if 6 units are available at prices of $550 
or below. The buyer will purchase no units priced above $550.  
 
2) The buyer will purchase first from the seller posting the lowest price, then from 
the seller posting the second lowest price. Once a seller has been selected, the 
buyer will purchase all units that can be afforded from that seller. If the buyer 
finishes making purchases from one seller and still wishes to buy more units, then 
the buyer will switch to the other seller.  
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3) If two sellers post identical prices and the total number of units offered exceeds 6 
units, then the buyer will buy the same number of units from both sellers. For 
example, if each seller offers 4 units at the same price, then the buyer will 
purchase an equal amount from each seller.  
 
Sellers 
 In this experiment there are two sellers in every market who are paired throughout 
the 60 periods. If you are a seller, your computer screen displays your costs —one cost 
value for each unit you might sell. The sellers are identical. That is, sellers incur the same 
per-unit cost when they sell a unit. Sellers may sell at most four units. See Figure 1 (the 
costs of the units you might sell on this example screen are completely different from the 
actual costs used in the experiment).  
 
Figure 1: Example Market Trading Screen for Sellers 
 
 The profits from sales in each period (which are yours to keep) are computed by 
taking the difference between the amount of revenue you receive from the buyer minus 
the necessary production costs.   
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The revenue you receive from the buyer equals, of course, the price you charge times the 
quantity you actually sell. The buyer chooses how much to buy from you, up to the 
maximum quantity you have chosen to offer to the market. Your production cost is based 
on the units purchased from you. 
That is, 
[your earnings = (selling price × number of units sold ) – (production cost of units sold)]. 
  Suppose, for example, that the cost for your first unit is 2000, and the cost of your 
second unit is 2000. If you sell one unit at a price of 2050 your earnings are: 
Earnings = (2050 × 1) – (2000) = 50. 
If you sell two units at a price of 2050 your earnings are: 
Earnings = (2050 × 2) – (2000+2000) = 100. 
 Your earnings per period and from all periods will be updated at the end of every period 
at the bottom of your computer screen, and are labeled Profit this period and Total profit 
from all periods, respectively. At the end of every period your computer screen will also 
display Your price, the Other seller’s price, the Number of units you sold, and the Total 
quantity sold in the market. (See Figure 2.) 
 
Figure 2: Example Market Trading Screen for Sellers 
 
 Notice that if a unit costs more than the amount for which you sell it then you suffer a 
loss in earnings on that unit. If you do not sell any units in a period then your earnings are 
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zero for that period. Importantly, you do not incur the cost of a unit unless you sell that 
unit.  
 
How to Sell 
 In each period you post a SELLING PRICE. Note that both you and the seller you 
are paired with must post a selling price which is a multiple of 50. You also select a 
QUANTITY. This limit represents the maximum number of units that you are willing to 
sell AT THE SELLING PRICE. You may offer as many units as you have available. 
However, if the posted price does not exceed the cost of all offered units, you lose 
earnings.  You will enter selling prices and quantity using your computer. Figure 1 shows 
the market trading screen as seen by sellers. You submit selling prices and quantity limits 
using the “Selling Price” and “Quantity” box in the lower center of the screen, and then 
clicking on the “Continue” button. Once the selling price and the quantity are submitted, 
they are binding in the sense that the buyer can buy some or all of the units offered. This 
results in an immediate trade at the posted price. 
   The selling prices and the quantities of all the sellers are then given to the buyer, and 
the buyer may then purchase as much as he wishes from those goods that have been made 
available to him. A period ends when the buyer finishes making purchases, or when all 
sellers are out of units.  
Recording Rules for Sellers 
 Your earnings per period and from all periods will be updated at the end of every 
period at the bottom of your computer screen, and are labeled Profit this period and Total 
profit from all periods, respectively. At the end of every period your computer screen will 
also display Your  price, the Other seller’s price, the Number of units you sold, and the 
Total quantity sold in the market. Your Personal Record Sheet contains 7 columns. At the 
end of a trading period you should write down the price you posted in column (2), the 
other seller’s price in column (3), the units you sold in column (4), the number of units 
sold in the market in column (5),  the per period profit in (6), and the total profit from all 
periods in (7). At the end of the experiment you will divide your total profit from all 
periods by the conversion rate to determine your total earnings in real Dollars. 
 
 37 
Summary 
• Sellers post selling prices and quantities. In making a price/quantity 
posting, the seller indicates a willingness to sell the posted number of 
units at the selling price 
• There is one buyer who is played by the computer 
• The buyer will purchase a total of 6 units, if 6 units are available at prices 
of $550 or below. The buyer will purchase no units priced above $550  
• In the event that the two sellers post the same price and the total number 
of units offered exceeds 6 units, the buyer will buy the same number of 
units from both sellers   
• Seller earnings = (selling price × number of units sold ) – (production 
cost of units sold) 
• A period ends when the buyer finishes to make his purchases, or when all 
sellers are out of units 
• At the end of the period your computer screen displays:  
(1) Your price 
(2) The price posted by the other seller 
(3) Number of units you sold 
(4) Total quantity sold in the market 
(5) Your profit this period 
(6) Your profit from all periods 
• Sellers should record these on Record Sheets at the end of each period 
 
Are there any questions now before we begin the experiment? 
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Personal Record Sheet for Subject   
Period 
 
 
(1) 
Your 
Price 
 
(2) 
Other 
Seller’s 
Price 
(3) 
Units you 
sold 
 
(4) 
Units sold 
in the 
market 
(5) 
Period 
Profit 
 
(6) 
Total 
Profit from 
all periods 
(7) 
1       
2       
3       
4       
5       
6       
7       
8       
9       
10       
11       
12       
13       
14       
15       
16       
17       
18       
19       
20       
21       
22       
23       
24       
25       
26       
27       
28       
29       
30       
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Period 
 
 
(1) 
Your 
Price 
 
(2) 
Other 
Seller’s 
Price 
(3) 
Units you 
sold 
 
(4) 
Units sold 
in the 
market 
(5) 
Period 
Profit 
 
(6) 
Total 
Profit from 
all periods 
(7) 
31       
32       
33       
34       
35       
36       
37       
38       
39       
40       
41       
42       
43       
44       
45       
46       
47       
48       
49       
50       
51       
52       
53       
54       
55       
56       
57       
58       
59       
60       
    Divide by Conversion 
Rate 
 
     Converted 
Total 
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Instructions 
 
General 
 This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The 
instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you 
will earn money that will be paid to you privately in cash. All earnings in your computer 
screens are in Experimental Dollars. These Experimental Dollars will be converted to real 
Dollars at the end of the experiment, at a rate of ________ Experimental Dollars = 1 real 
Dollar. 
We are going to conduct a set of markets in which you will be a participant in a sequence 
of 60 trading periods where you can sell units of a good X. There are two sellers in every 
market. You will be a seller in today’s experiment, and you will remain in this role 
throughout the experiment. During each trading period you will be free to sell units of the 
good X as you choose. Sellers earn money from selling units that cost a known amount.  
Attached to these instructions you will find a sheet labeled Personal Record Sheet, which 
will also help you keep track of your earnings based on the decisions you might make. 
You are not to reveal this information to anyone. It is your own private information.  
 
PERIODS 1-60 
Buyers 
The buyers’ side of the market in today’s experiment is simulated by a computer.  
There is a single buyer. The buyer will make purchases according to the following rules. 
 
1) The buyer will purchase a total of 6 units, if 6 units are available at prices of $550 
or below. The buyer will purchase no units priced above $550.  
 
2) The buyer will purchase first from the seller posting the lowest price, then from the 
seller posting the second lowest price. Once a seller has been selected, the buyer will 
purchase all units that can be afforded from that seller. If the buyer finishes making 
purchases from one seller and still wishes to buy more units, then the buyer will 
switch to the other seller.  
 
 41 
3) If two sellers post identical prices, then the buyer will randomly choose which 
seller to approach first.  
Sellers 
 In this experiment there are two sellers in every market who are paired throughout 
the 60 periods. If you are a seller, your computer screen displays your costs —one cost 
value for each unit you might sell. The sellers are identical. That is, sellers incur the same 
per-unit cost when they sell a unit. Sellers may sell at most four units. See Figure 1 (the 
costs of the units you might sell on this example screen are completely different from the 
actual costs used in the experiment).  
 
Figure 1: Example Market Trading Screen for Sellers 
 
 The profits from sales in each period (which are yours to keep) are computed by 
taking the difference between the amount of revenue you receive from the buyer minus 
the necessary production costs.   
The revenue you receive from the buyer equals, of course, the price you charge times the 
quantity you actually sell. The buyer chooses how much to buy from you, up to the 
maximum quantity you have chosen to offer to the market. Your production cost is based 
on the units purchased from you. 
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That is, 
[your earnings = (selling price × number of units sold ) – (production cost of units sold)]. 
  Suppose, for example, that the cost for your first unit is 2000, and the cost of your 
second unit is 2000. If you sell one unit at a price of 2050 your earnings are: 
Earnings = (2050 × 1) – (2000) = 50. 
If you sell two units at a price of 2050 your earnings are: 
Earnings = (2050 × 2) – (2000+2000) = 100. 
 Your earnings per period and from all periods will be updated at the end of every period 
on the bottom of your computer screen, and are labeled Profit this period and Total profit 
from all periods, respectively. At the end of every period your computer screen will also 
display Your price, the Other seller’s price, the Number of units you sold, and the Total 
quantity sold in the market. (See Figure 2.) 
 
Figure 2: Example Market Trading Screen for Sellers. 
 
 Notice that if a unit costs more than the amount for which you sell it then you suffer a 
loss in earnings on that unit. If you do not sell any units in a period then your earnings are 
zero for that period. Importantly, you do not incur the cost of a unit unless you sell that 
unit.  
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How to Sell 
 In each period you post a SELLING PRICE. Note that both you and the seller you 
are paired with must post a selling price which is a multiple of 50. You also select a 
QUANTITY. This limit represents the maximum number of units that you are willing to 
sell AT THE SELLING PRICE. You may offer as many units as you have available. 
However, if the posted price does not exceed the cost of all offered units, you lose 
earnings.  You will enter selling prices and quantity using your computer. Figure 1 shows 
the market trading screen as seen by sellers. You submit selling prices and quantity limits 
using the “Selling Price” and “Quantity” box in the lower center of the screen, and then 
clicking on the “Continue” button. Once the selling price and the quantity are submitted, 
they are binding in the sense that the buyer can buy some or all of the units offered. This 
results in an immediate trade at the posted price. 
   The selling prices and the quantities of all the sellers are then given to the buyer, and 
the buyer may then purchase as much as he wishes from those goods that have been made 
available to him. A period ends when the buyer finishes making purchases, or when all 
sellers are out of units.  
 
Recording Rules for Sellers 
 Your earnings per period and from all periods will be updated at the end of every 
period on the bottom of your computer screen, and are labeled Profit this period and 
Total profit from all periods, respectively. At the end of every period your computer 
screen will also display Your  price, the Other seller’s price, the Number of units you 
sold, and the Total quantity sold in the market. Your Personal Record Sheet contains 7 
columns. At the end of a trading period you should write down the price you posted in 
column (2), the other seller’s price in column (3), the units you sold in column (4), the 
number of units sold in the market in column (5),   the per period profit in (6), and the 
total profit from all periods in (7). At the end of the experiment you will divide your total 
profit from all periods by the conversion rate to determine your total earnings in real 
Dollars. 
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Summary 
 
• Sellers post selling prices and quantities. In making a price/quantity 
posting, the seller indicates a willingness to sell the posted number of 
units at the selling price 
• There is one buyer who is played by the computer 
• The buyer will purchase a total of 6 units, if 6 units are available at prices 
of $550 or below. The buyer will purchase no units priced above $550  
• If two sellers post identical prices, then the buyer will randomly choose 
which seller to approach first  
• Seller earnings = (selling price × number of units sold ) – (production 
cost of units sold) 
• A period ends when the buyer finishes to make his purchases, or when all 
sellers are out of units 
• At the end of the period your computer screen displays:  
(1) Your price 
(2) The price posted by the other seller 
(3) Number of units you sold 
(4) Total quantity sold in the market 
(5) Your profit this period 
(6) Your profit from all periods 
• Sellers should record these on Record Sheets at the end of each period 
 
Are there any questions now before we begin the experiment?  
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Personal Record Sheet for Subject   
 
Period 
 
 
(1) 
Your 
Price 
 
(2) 
Other 
Seller’s 
Price 
(3) 
Units you 
sold 
 
(4) 
Units sold 
in the 
market 
(5) 
Period 
Profit 
 
(6) 
Total 
Profit from 
all periods 
(7) 
1       
2       
3       
4       
5       
6       
7       
8       
9       
10       
11       
12       
13       
14       
15       
16       
17       
18       
19       
20       
21       
22       
23       
24       
25       
26       
27       
28       
29       
30       
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Period 
 
 
(1) 
Your 
Price 
 
(2) 
Other 
Seller’s 
Price 
(3) 
Units you 
sold 
 
(4) 
Units sold 
in the 
market 
(5) 
Period 
Profit 
 
(6) 
Total 
Profit from 
all periods 
(7) 
31       
32       
33       
34       
35       
36       
37       
38       
39       
40       
41       
42       
43       
44       
45       
46       
47       
48       
49       
50       
51       
52       
53       
54       
55       
56       
57       
58       
59       
60       
    Divide by Conversion 
Rate 
 
     Converted 
Total 
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Instructions 
 
General 
 This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The 
instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you 
will earn money that will be paid to you privately in cash. All earnings in your computer 
screens are in Experimental Dollars. These Experimental Dollars will be converted to real 
Dollars at the end of the experiment, at a rate of ________ Experimental Dollars = 1 real 
Dollar. 
We are going to conduct a set of markets in which you will be a participant in a sequence 
of 60 trading periods where you can sell units of a good X. There are two sellers in every 
market. You will be a seller in today’s experiment, and you will remain in this role 
throughout the experiment. During each trading period you will be free to sell units of the 
good X as you choose. Sellers earn money from selling units that cost a known amount.  
Attached to these instructions you will find a sheet labeled Personal Record Sheet, which 
will also help you keep track of your earnings based on the decisions you might make. 
You are not to reveal this information to anyone. It is your own private information.  
 
PERIODS 1-60 
Buyers 
The buyers’ side of the market in today’s experiment is simulated by a computer.  
There is a single buyer. The buyer will make purchases according to the following rules. 
 
1) The buyer will purchase a total of 6 units, if 6 units are available at prices of $550 
or below. The buyer will purchase no units priced above $550.  
 
2) The buyer will purchase first from the seller posting the lowest price, then from the 
seller posting the second lowest price. Once a seller has been selected, the buyer will 
purchase all units that can be afforded from that seller. If the buyer finishes making 
purchases from one seller and still wishes to buy more units, then the buyer will 
switch to the other seller.  
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3) If two sellers post identical prices, then the buyer will randomly choose which 
seller to approach first.  
Sellers 
 In this experiment there are two sellers in every market who are paired throughout 
the 60 periods. If you are a seller, your computer screen displays your costs —one cost 
value for each unit you might sell. The sellers are identical. That is, sellers incur the same 
per-unit cost when they sell a unit. Sellers may sell at most four units. See Figure 1 (the 
costs of the units you might sell on this example screen are completely different from the 
actual costs used in the experiment).  
 
Figure 1: Example Market Trading Screen for Sellers 
 
 The profits from sales in each period (which are yours to keep) are computed by 
taking the difference between the amount of revenue you receive from the buyer minus 
the necessary production costs.   
The revenue you receive from the buyer equals, of course, the price you charge times the 
quantity you actually sell. The buyer chooses how much to buy from you, up to the 
maximum quantity you have chosen to offer to the market. Your production cost is based 
on the units purchased from you. 
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That is, 
[your earnings = (selling price × number of units sold ) – (production cost of units sold)]. 
  Suppose, for example, that the cost for your first unit is 2000, and the cost of your 
second unit is 2000. If you sell one unit at a price of 2050 your earnings are: 
Earnings = (2050 × 1) – (2000) = 50. 
If you sell two units at a price of 2050 your earnings are: 
Earnings = (2050 × 2) – (2000+2000) = 100. 
 Your earnings per period and from all periods will be updated at the end of every period 
on the bottom of your computer screen, and are labeled Profit this period and Total profit 
from all periods, respectively. At the end of every period your computer screen will also 
display Your price, the Other seller’s price, the Number of units you sold, and the Total 
quantity sold in the market. (See Figure 2.) 
 
Figure 2: Example Market Trading Screen for Sellers. 
 
 Notice that if a unit costs more than the amount for which you sell it then you suffer a 
loss in earnings on that unit. If you do not sell any units in a period then your earnings are 
zero for that period. Importantly, you do not incur the cost of a unit unless you sell that 
unit.  
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How to Sell 
 In each period you post a SELLING PRICE. Note that both you and the seller you 
are paired with must post a selling price which is a multiple of 50. You also select a 
QUANTITY. This limit represents the maximum number of units that you are willing to 
sell AT THE SELLING PRICE. You may offer as many units as you have available. 
However, if the posted price does not exceed the cost of all offered units, you lose 
earnings.  You will enter selling prices and quantity using your computer. Figure 1 shows 
the market trading screen as seen by sellers. You submit selling prices and quantity limits 
using the “Selling Price” and “Quantity” box in the lower center of the screen, and then 
clicking on the “Continue” button. Once the selling price and the quantity are submitted, 
they are binding in the sense that the buyer can buy some or all of the units offered. This 
results in an immediate trade at the posted price. 
   The selling prices and the quantities of all the sellers are then given to the buyer, and 
the buyer may then purchase as much as he wishes from those goods that have been made 
available to him. A period ends when the buyer finishes making purchases, or when all 
sellers are out of units.  
 
Recording Rules for Sellers 
 Your earnings per period and from all periods will be updated at the end of every 
period on the bottom of your computer screen, and are labeled Profit this period and 
Total profit from all periods, respectively. At the end of every period your computer 
screen will also display Your  price, the Other seller’s price, the Number of units you 
sold, and the Total quantity sold in the market. Your Personal Record Sheet contains 7 
columns. At the end of a trading period you should write down the price you posted in 
column (2), the other seller’s price in column (3), the units you sold in column (4), the 
number of units sold in the market in column (5),   the per period profit in (6), and the 
total profit from all periods in (7). At the end of the experiment you will divide your total 
profit from all periods by the conversion rate to determine your total earnings in real 
Dollars. 
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Summary 
 
• Sellers post selling prices and quantities. In making a price/quantity 
posting, the seller indicates a willingness to sell the posted number of 
units at the selling price 
• There is one buyer who is played by the computer 
• The buyer will purchase a total of 6 units, if 6 units are available at prices 
of $550 or below. The buyer will purchase no units priced above $550  
• If two sellers post identical prices, then the buyer will randomly choose 
which seller to approach first  
• Seller earnings = (selling price × number of units sold ) – (production 
cost of units sold) 
• A period ends when the buyer finishes to make his purchases, or when all 
sellers are out of units 
• At the end of the period your computer screen displays:  
(1) Your price 
(2) The price posted by the other seller 
(3) Number of units you sold 
(4) Total quantity sold in the market 
(5) Your profit this period 
(6) Your profit from all periods 
• Sellers should record these on Record Sheets at the end of each period 
 
Are there any questions now before we begin the experiment?  
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Personal Record Sheet for Subject   
 
Period 
 
 
(1) 
Your 
Price 
 
(2) 
Other 
Seller’s 
Price 
(3) 
Units you 
sold 
 
(4) 
Units sold 
in the 
market 
(5) 
Period 
Profit 
 
(6) 
Total 
Profit from 
all periods 
(7) 
1       
2       
3       
4       
5       
6       
7       
8       
9       
10       
11       
12       
13       
14       
15       
16       
17       
18       
19       
20       
21       
22       
23       
24       
25       
26       
27       
28       
29       
30       
 53 
Period 
 
 
(1) 
Your 
Price 
 
(2) 
Other 
Seller’s 
Price 
(3) 
Units you 
sold 
 
(4) 
Units sold 
in the 
market 
(5) 
Period 
Profit 
 
(6) 
Total 
Profit from 
all periods 
(7) 
31       
32       
33       
34       
35       
36       
37       
38       
39       
40       
41       
42       
43       
44       
45       
46       
47       
48       
49       
50       
51       
52       
53       
54       
55       
56       
57       
58       
59       
60       
    Divide by Conversion 
Rate 
 
     Converted 
Total 
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